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NOTES AND COMMENTS
007-Licensed to Limit Without Notice:
The Case of Chan v. Korean
Air Lines, Ltd.
I. INTRODUCTION
All two hundred sixty-nine persons on board Korean Air Lines
flight 007 died on September 1, 1983 when a Soviet aircraft shot down
the airliner over the Sea of Japan.' The flight departed from New
York's Kennedy Airport and was en route to Seoul, South Korea
when the airplane veered off course.2 When the airplane crew refused
to answer Soviet communications, Soviet military aircraft destroyed
the commercial airliner.3 The passengers' beneficiaries sued Korean
Air Lines ("KAL") under the legal authority of the 1929 Warsaw
Convention ("Convention") 4 and the 1966 Montreal Agreement.5
They claimed that KAL's failure to provide adequate notice of the
Convention's international limits on personal injury damages thereby
deprived the airline of this liability protection.
6
This Note will examine the United States Supreme Court case of
Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd. ,7 which addressed the issue of whether
the airline's failure to notify passengers in 10-point type of the
$75,000 personal injury damage limitation, imposed by the Conven-
1. In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171, 1172 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transpor-
tation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, reprinted in note following 49 U.S.C.
app. § 1502, at 1225 (1982) [hereinafter Convention]. The Warsaw Convention established
international causes of action and corresponding liability limits for air crash personal injury
suits. Id.
5. Agreement Relating to Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and the
Hague Protocol, CAB Agreement 18900, reprinted in note following 49 U.S.C. app. § 1502
(1982) (approved by CAB Order E-23680, May 13, 1966, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302) [hereinafter
Montreal Agreement]. The Montreal Agreement was a private contractual agreement among
air carriers and the United States which raised the liability limit to $75,000 and required writ-
ten notice of the limitation to passengers in 10-point type print. Id.
6. In re Korean Air Lines. 829 F.2d at 1172.
7. 109 S. Ct. 1676 (1989).
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tion and the Montreal Agreement, deprived the airline of such liabil-
ity protection." The Court concluded that neither the Convention nor
the Montreal Agreement mandated such a severe sanction when the
airline provided passengers with notice in 8-point type.9 In order to
understand the Convention's importance in modem times, this Note
will explore the history behind the Warsaw Convention and its subse-
quent evolution in the courts. Additionally, this Note will suggest
that the Court's new textualist philosophy for treaty interpretation, as
applied in Chan, counterintuitively encourages further judicial
activism and permits the courts to disregard the intent and legislative
goals of the original drafters. The viability of the Convention in the
next decade can only be assured if the Court reevaluates the anti-
quated Convention under constitutional scrutiny. Only this broad
reading of the 1929 Warsaw Convention can produce equitable results
for plaintiffs in the 1990s.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Initially, many lawsuits on behalf of the KAL victims were filed
in multiple federal districts.10 A Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Liti-
gation then consolidated these actions in the District of Columbia
Circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407. 1 In the district court, all par-
ties agreed that their rights were governed by the Convention.12 The
plaintiffs then moved for partial summary judgment and a declaration
that the lack of 10-point type notice automatically disqualified KAL
from the protections of the Convention's liability limitation.' 3 The
district court denied their motion, concluding that neither the Con-
vention nor the Montreal Agreement prescribed a sanction of forfei-
ture of the damage limitation for failure to provide 10-point type
8. Id. at 1678.
9. Id. at 1684.
10. The cases filed as a result of the KAL air disaster can be grouped into three catego-
ries: (1) the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York; (2) the Eastern District of Michigan
and the District of Massachusetts; and (3) the District of Columbia. In re Korean Air Lines,
829 F.2d at 1173.
11. Id. at 1172. "[C]ivil actions involving one or more common questions of fact ...
pending in different districts... may be transferred to any district for coordinated or consoli-
dated pretrial proceedings." Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1407).
12. Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1678. Article I of the Convention governs these parties and
states: "This convention shall apply to all international transportation of persons, baggage, or
goods performed by aircraft for hire ...." Convention, supra note 4, at 1225.
13. In re Korean Airlines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 644 F. Supp. 1463, 1464 (D.D.C.
1985), aff'd, 829 F.2d 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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notice. 14
In response, the plaintiffs filed an interlocutory appeal. The ap-
pellate court remanded the case to clarify the scope of the district
court's order.'5 Following an affirmation by the district court that the
order encompassed all the plaintiffs, the appellate court affirmed the
lower court's order in full. 16 The United States Supreme Court then
granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the circuit courts re-
garding whether the Convention or the Montreal Agreement should
be interpreted to prescribe sanctions for failure to provide a standard-
ized notice. 17
In the Supreme Court, Petitioners' original appeal consisted of
two primary arguments. First, the plaintiffs asserted that under Arti-
cle 3 of the Convention, the air carrier forfeits its limited liability
when it fails to provide adequate notice of the Convention's liability
limitation on its passenger tickets.18 Petitioners reached this conclu-
sion by reading Article 3(I)(e) of the Convention in conjunction with
the second sentence of Article 3(2). 19 Second, Petitioners argued that
the notice statement on the ticket must be in 10-point type as man-
dated by the Montreal Agreement 20 and a 1963 Civil Aeronautics
14. Id.
15. The appellate court remanded to determine which plaintiffs were covered by the dis-
trict court order and to resolve the issue of the transferee court's authority under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1407 and Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964), to independently decide issues of
federal law already determined by a circuit court in the transferor forum. In re Korean Air
Lines, 829 F.2d at 1173.
16. In re Korean Air Lines, 829 F.2d at 1176.
17. Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 485 U.S. 986 (1988).
18. Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1679.
19. The specifics of this limitation are provided in Article 3:
(1) For the transportation of passengers the carrier must deliver a passenger
ticket which shall contain the following particulars:
(a) The place and date of issue;
(b) The place of departure and of destination;
(c) The agreed stopping places, provided that the carrier may reserve the right
to alter the stopping places in case of necessity, and that if he exercises that right, the
alteration shall not have the effect of depriving the transportation of its international
character;
(d) The name and address of the carrier or carriers;
(e) A statement that the transportation is subject to the rules relating to liability
established by this convention.
(2) The absence, irregularity, or loss of the passenger ticket shall not affect the
existence or the validity of the contract of transportation, which shall none the less be
subject to the rules of this convention. Nevertheless, if the carrier accepts a passen-
ger without a passenger ticket having been delivered he shall not be entitled to avail
himself of those provisions of this convention which exclude or limit his liability.
Convention, supra note 4, at 1226.
20. The relevant portion of the Montreal Agreement dictates:
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Board ("CAB") regulation.21 Thus, KAL's failure to give the plain-
tiffs adequate, 10-point type notice precluded the airline from invok-
ing the Convention's ceiling on personal injury compensation.
III. HISTORY OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION
The complete chronology of the Warsaw Convention must be
clearly understood in order to effectively evaluate the Court's legal
analysis of the Chan case. The Convention resulted from two confer-
ences, the first in Paris in 1925 and the second in Warsaw in 1929,
and the additional, interim drafting expertise of the Comitd Interna-
tional Technique d'Experts Juridique Adriens, a committee of private
experts. 22 The treaty became effective on February 13, 1933.23
Although not an original party to the Convention, 24 the United States
2. Each carrier shall, at the time of delivery of the ticket, furnish to each passen-
ger whose transportation is governed by the Convention ... the following notice,
which shall be printed in types at least as large as 10 point and in ink contrasting
with the stock on (i) each ticket; (ii) a piece of paper either placed in the ticket
envelope with the ticket or attached to the ticket; or (iii) on the ticket envelope:
ADVICE TO INTERNATIONAL PASSENGER ON LIMITATION OF
LIABILITY
Passengers on a journey involving an ultimate destination or a stop in a country
other than the country of origin are advised that the provisions of a treaty known as
the Warsaw Convention may be applicable to the entire journey, including any por-
tion entirely within the country of origin or destination. For such passengers on a
journey to, from, or with an agreed stopping place in the United States of America,
the Convention and special contracts of carriage embodied in applicable tariffs pro-
vide that the liability of certain (name the carrier) and certain other carriers parties
to such special contracts for death of or personal injury to passengers is limited in
most cases to proven damages not to exceed US $75,000 per passenger, and that this
liability up to such limit shall not depend on negligence on the part of the carrier.
For such passengers travelling by a carrier not a party to such special contracts or on
a journey not to, from, or having an agreed stopping place in the United States of
America, liability of the carrier for death or personal injury to passengers is limited
in most cases to approximately US $8,290 or US $16,580.
Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1679 n. 1 (quoting Montreal Agreement).
21. 14 C.F.R. §§ 221.174-.175 (1989). The Chan majority did not address either the
Montreal Agreement or the CAB regulation because it rejected the argument that the Conven-
tion penalized inadequate notice by forfeiture of Convention limitations. However, the con-
currence, while not necessarily agreeing with the majority's resolution of the first issue,
concluded that the 10-point type notice, as dictated by either the Montreal Agreement or the
CAB regulation, was not mandated because the KAL passengers received actual notice.
Although mere dicta, the concurrence's resolution of the 10-point type notice standard illus-
trates that even the most liberal members of the Court clearly believe that actual 10-point type
notice is not required for an air carrier to be protected by the Convention limitations. See
Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1679, 1692-93.
22. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV.
L. REV. 497, 498 (1967).
23. Id. at 501-02.
24. The original parties were Germany, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Den-
mark, Iceland, Egypt, Spain, Estonia, Finland, France, Great Britain, Ireland, India, Greece,
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adhered to the Convention in 1934 following Senate approval and a
proclamation by President Roosevelt. 25 As a self-executing treaty, the
Convention did not require domestic legislation to give it the effect of
the supreme law of the land in the United States.
26
The Convention had two main purposes: to establish uniformity
in documentation and legal procedure, 27 and more importantly, to
limit the potential liability of the fledgling airline industry in order to
encourage capital investment in the new industry.28 The Convention
established an $8,300 limit on personal injury awards recoverable
from the airlines in exchange for a presumption of liability against
them.29 However, within one year of the Convention's implementa-
tion, the United States became dissatisfied with the liability
limitation. 30
It was not until 1955 that the Convention signatories met again
to amend the 1929 treaty. 31 This meeting resulted in the Hague Pro-
tocol, which doubled the personal injury limitation to $16,600 and
Hungary, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Norway, the Netherlands, Poland, Ru-
mania, Sweden, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, the USSR, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia. Conven-
tion, supra note 4, at 1225.
25. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 22, at 502. The United States joined the Con-
vention through the adherence provision contained in Article 38 of the Convention.
(1) This convention shall, after it has come into force, remain open for adher-
ence by any state.
(2) The adherence shall be effected by a notification addressed to the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Poland, which shall inform the Government of each of the
High Contracting Parties thereof.
(3) The adherence shall take effect as from the ninetieth day after the notifica-
tion made to the Government of the Republic of Poland.
Convention, supra note 4, at 1229.
26. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984).
Although domestic legislation was not required, the United States Senate consented to the
Convention through a voice vote without debate, committee hearing, or report. Lowenfeld &
Mendelsohn, supra note 22, at 502. Treaties are the supreme law of the land under the Consti-
tution. U.S. CONST. art. IV.
27. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 22, at 498.
28. Id. at 499.
29. Id. at 500.
30. Id. at 504. There was concern over the general concept of a limitation because some
countries preferred to subject the airlines to unlimited liability. Note, Avoiding the Perils of
Judicial Treatywriting: In re Korean Air Lines Disaster, 62 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 156, 157 n.6
(1987). Additionally, specific airline accidents in which plaintiffs received inadequate compen-
sation under the $8,300 limitation contributed to the American disapproval of the Convention.
See Ross v. Pan Am. Airways, 299 N.Y. 88, 85 N.E.2d 880 (1949), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 947
(1955).
31. The United States was not the only country dissatisfied with the low limitations of the
Convention. Great Britain also advocated doubling, tripling, or even quadrupling the limita-
tion amount. Cohen, Montreal Protocol: The Most Recent Attempt to Modify the Warsaw Con-
vention, 8 AIR L. 146, 151 n.68 (1983).
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required adequate notice of the Convention's limitations, which each
nation could regulate independently.3 2 The United States never ap-
proved the Hague Protocol, primarily because of the nation's concern
over the principle of limited liability, and its desire for a standardized
and conspicuous form of notice. 33 Thus, although the United States
was dissatisfied with the Convention, its inability to agree on an
amendment left the Convention limitations intact.
Reacting to the Hague Protocol, the CAB established a regula-
tion requiring notice of the Convention limitations in 10-point type on
all passenger tickets. 34 This regulation was a response to a provision
of the Protocol which permitted each country to regulate internally,
within its own airspace, the required notice of liability.35 To enforce
this domestic 10-point type regulation, the CAB required foreign air-
lines to agree to the rule as a condition precedent to the issuance of a
United States landing permit.3 6 Although the CAB regulation re-
solved national concerns for flights touching down in the United
States, it did nothing to resolve the American concerns regarding the
international effects of the Convention. Thus, the United States no
longer perceived any diplomatic advantage in maintaining Conven-
tion membership.3 7 On November 15, 1965, the United States filed a
Notice of Denunciation of the Warsaw Convention,3 8 but agreed to
withdraw the denunciation if an international conference addressing
American concerns would result in an amendment of the Conven-
32. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 22, at 507.
33. Id. at 511-12. Although the United States delegate to the Hague Conference signed
the Protocol on June 28, 1956, the United States Senate never ratified the Protocol because of
the bad political climate caused by an abundance of fatal air crashes. Cohen, supra note 31, at
153 n.91.
34. 14 C.F.R. § 221.175 (1989).
35. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 22, at 514.
36. 14 C.F.R. §§ 203.5, 213.7 (1989).
37. The Convention's previous advantage of a presumption of liability against the air
carrier was no longer an important benefit to the United States plaintiffs since the advent of the
"res ipsa loquitur" doctrine which provided an inference of negligence by the carrier. Cohen,
supra note 31, at 154.
38. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 22, at 551. The United States denounced the
Convention pursuant to Article 39:
(1) Any one of the High Contracting Parties may denounce this convention by a
notification addressed to the Government of the Republic of Poland, which shall at
once inform the Government of each of the High Contracting Parties.
(2) Denunciation shall take effect six months after the notification of denuncia-
tion, and shall operate only as regards the party which shall have proceeded to
denunciation.
Convention, supra note 4, at 1229.
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tion.39 This serious threat to international diplomacy created the im-
petus for the Montreal Agreement. 4°
The Montreal Agreement was intended merely as an interim
agreement to avert the United States' Convention denunciation. 41
The Agreement was a special contract between the private airlines42
and the United States government, as authorized by Article 22(1) of
the Convention.43 The Agreement applied to any flight that
originated, ended, or touched down in the United States.44 It re-
placed the $8,300 Convention limit with a liability ceiling of
$75,000.45 Additionally, the Agreement required 10-point type notice
of the Convention's liability limitations and waived the airlines' previ-
ous liability defense of due care."6 Although the United States ac-
cepted the Agreement's terms, the nation still viewed the Agreement
as a temporary measure and continued to seek a permanent amend-
ment to the Convention. 47
In 1971, there was another international attempt to amend the
Convention. 48 The Guatemala Protocol established absolute, no-fault
liability for the airlines and increased the damage limitation to
39. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 22, at 552.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 563.
42. This agreement was a private, nongovernmental regional plan, independent of the
Convention. Matte, The Warsaw System and the Hesitations ofthe US. Senate, 8 ANNALS OF
AIR & SPACE L. 151, 156 (1983). Other carriers are also bound by similar private agreements
which mandate limits equal to or above $58,000, including: Air Afrique, Austrian Airlines,
Sabena, Burma Airways, Scandinavian Airlines Systems, TACA, Finnair, Air France, Air In-
dia, UTA, Lufthansa, Condor Fludienst, Irish Government for all Irish carriers, El Al, Alitalia
for both domestic and international carriage, Japan Airlines, Alia Royal Jordanian Airlines,
Middle East Airlines, Luxair, Malaysian Airlines, KLM, Martinair, Transavia, Air New Zea-
land, Norwegian Government for all Norwegian airlines, Air Panama, Singapore International
Airlines, South African Airways, Iberia, Sweden for all domestic and international flights by
Swedish carriers, Switzerland, as a licensing condition, Thai International Airlines, and Tunis
Air. Cohen, supra note 31, at 157 n.143.
43. Convention, supra note 4. Article 22(1) provides that the private parties may con-
tract for a higher level of air carrier liability. "Nevertheless, by special contract, the carrier
and the passenger may agree to a higher limit of liability." Id. at 1228.
44. Montreal Agreement, supra note 5, at 1230.
45. Id. It was the $8,300 Convention limit rather than the Hague Protocol limit of
$16,600 that was upgraded since the higher limit was ineffective due to the United States'
failure to approve the Protocol. Id. at 1229 n. 1.
46. Id. at 1230.
47. Matte, supra note 42, at 157.
48. Id. The conference lasted from February 9 to March 8, 1971 and was attended by
delegates from fifty-five countries. Cohen, supra note 31, at 158 n. 149. Of these delegates,
only twenty-one actually signed the Protocol at the conference's conclusion. Id.
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L[
$100,000 per passenger. 49 However, the United States delegates re-
fused to submit this plan to the United States Senate, because Proto-
col limitation standards were unacceptably expressed in terms of
gold.5 0 The United States' failure to seriously consider the proposal
rendered the Guatemala Protocol ineffective as an international
compromise. 5'
The final attempt to amend the Convention was the 1975 Mon-
treal Protocol. 52 This time, the United States Senate rejected the pro-
posed amendment, refusing to accept any limitation on personal
injury liability. 53 Thus, these four amendment attempts-the Hague
Protocol, the Montreal Agreement, the Guatemala Protocol, and the
Montreal Protocol-have all failed to update the 1929 Convention.
All four proposals have inadequately addressed the United States con-
cerns-primarily the eradication of the limitation on personal injury
recovery.-4 The resulting irony is that the 1929 Convention, with its
$8,300 limit, remains the controlling law of international airline
compensation.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S REASONING
A. The Majority
According to a majority of the Supreme Court in Chan, a carrier
is entitled to the protection of the Convention's liability limitations
even when the carrier fails to provide a passenger with the 10-point
type notice required by the Montreal Agreement. 55 The majority
based its reasoning on the plain meaning of the Convention and disre-
garded twenty years of United States judicial precedent which broadly
interpreted the treaty.5 6 Specifically, after examining language on the
face of the treaty and making internal structural comparisons, the ma-
49. Matte, supra note 42, at 157.
50. Id. at 158. The United States considered liability limits expressed in terms of gold, or
even linked to gold standards, to be inappropriate since gold prices had undergone severe
fluctuations over the years. Id.
51. The Protocol was void, as its acceptance by the United States was a condition to its
implementation. Cohen, supra note 31, at 158.
52. The key changes proposed in the Montreal Protocol were: 1) designating the mone-
tary limit in terms of a new international standard, the Special Drawing Right ("SDR"),
rather than the franc, 2) allowing each nation to determine its own increase in liability limits,
and 3) establishing absolute liability for the air carrier. Cohen, supra note 31, at 164-67;
Podgers, Aviation Law: Changes in the Wind?, I 1 THE BRIEF 26, 28-30 (1982).
53. Cohen, supra note 31, at 147.
54. Id.
55. Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 109 S. Ct. 1676, 1684 n.5 (1989).
56. Id. at 1680. See cases cited infra note 68.
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jority held that the Convention did not establish a forfeiture sanction
for a carrier's failure to provide adequate, 10-point type notice to air-
line passengers.
57
In examining the Convention, the Court stated that only a com-
plete failure to deliver a ticket mandated the forfeiture of liability lim-
itations. 58 Article 3(2) of the Convention establishes the forfeiture
sanction for noncompliance with Convention provisions.
The absence, irregularity, or loss of the passenger ticket shall
not affect the existence or the validity of the contract of transporta-
tion, which shall none the less be subject to the rules of this con-
vention. Nevertheless, if the carrier accepts a passenger without a
passenger ticket having been delivered he shall not be entitled to
avail himself of those provisions of this convention which exclude
or limit his liability. 59
The majority concluded that the actual text of the treaty was
clear, and, on its face, provided for situations such as inadequate no-
tice. 6° The use of 8-point type rather than 10-point type was a mere
"irregularity" that did not activate the unlimited liability sanction. 61
The Court next examined the treaty's internal structure by com-
paring the text of the Article 3 personal injury provision to the lan-
guage of the baggage and air freight sanctions contained in Articles 4
and 9.62 All three sections require a statement that the transportation
is subject to the Convention's liability rules. 63 All three sections also
mandate the loss of liability protection for failure to deliver a ticket or
a bill. 64 However, only Articles 4 and 9 specifically impose a sanction
for failure to include certain particulars, such as adequate 10-point
type notice, in the required documents. 65 Based on this internal struc-
tural comparison, the Court concluded that the baggage and freight
57. Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1680-82.
58. Id. at 1681. The Court also held that "delivery of a document whose shortcomings
are so extensive that it cannot reasonably be described as a 'ticket' (for example, a mistakenly
delivered blank form, with no data filled in)..." also justified the elimination of the liability
limitations. Id.
59. Convention, supra note 4, at 1226 (emphasis added).
60. Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1680.
61. Id. at 1681.
62. Id. at 1682; Convention, supra note 4, at 1226-27; see infra note 65 and accompany-
ing text.
63. Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1682; Convention, supra note 4, at 1226-27; see infra note 65 and
accompanying text.
64. Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1682; Convention, supra note 4, at 1226-27; see infra note 65 and
accompanying text.
65. Convention, supra note 4, at 1226-27. Article 4(3)(h) states that the baggage check
1990]
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sections clearly treat sanctions for inadequate notice as separate from
the nondelivery sanctions.66 Thus, the Court interpreted the treaty's
absence of an inadequate notice sanction for personal injury limita-
tions as a "plain meaning" that did not penalize carriers for failure to
provide 10-point type notice. 67
The Court's "plain meaning" conclusion directly conflicted with
federal appellate case law which broadly interpreted the "delivery"
requirement of Article 3(2). Those courts held that the language of
Article 3(2) included "delivery with proper notice. ' 68 Under this in-
terpretation, a failure to provide 10-point type notice would result in
the imposition of Convention sanctions.
The trend began in 1965 with the Second Circuit in Mertens v.
Flying Tiger Line, Inc. 69 The Mertens court held that the required
delivery of Article 3(2) mandated a delivery "in such a manner as to
afford [passengers] a reasonable opportunity to take measures to pro-
document shall contain, "[a] statement that the transportation is subject to the rules relating to
liability established by this convention." Id. Article 4(4) goes on to say that
[n]evertheless, if the carrier accepts baggage without a baggage check having been
delivered, or if the baggage check does not contain the particulars set out at (d), (f),
and (h) above, the carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of those provisions of
the convention which exclude or limit his liability.
Id. Article 8(q), pertaining to air waybills for freight, requires the same statement of limited
liability. Id. Article 9 then states,
[i]f the carrier accepts goods without an air waybill having been made out, or if the
air waybill does not contain all the particulars set out in article 8(a) to (), inclusive,
and (q), the carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provisions of this
convention which exclude or limit his liability.
Id.
66. Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1682-83.
67. Id. The concurrence argues that the absence of a specific sanction in Article 3(2) is a
mere drafting error. Id. at 1689-90. That opinion suggests that it is absurd to eliminate bag-
gage and freight damage limits for inadequate notice, while not eliminating limits for personal
injury damage-clearly a more important concern. Id. at 1683. However, the majority re-
sponds by explaining this distinction. Id. For instance, the drafters may have thought that the
original personal injury limitation of $8,300 was more than fair, or that passengers were more
likely to take out additional, private insurance to compensate for a damage limitation than
would someone for baggage or freight. Thus, according to the majority, the absence of a per-
sonal injury sanction was'an intentional rather than an accidental omission. Id.
68. This line of cases began with Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 341 F.2d 851 (2d
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965). The cases following or expanding this line of
reasoning include: Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966), aff'd by
equally divided court, 390 U.S. 455 (1968); In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, La., on
July 9, 1982, 789 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1986); In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Pol., on Mar.
14, 1980, 705 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 845 (1983); Deutsche Lufthansa
Aktiengesellschaft v. C.A.B., 479 F.2d 912 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Warren v. Flying Tiger Line,
Inc., 352 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1965); Egan v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 21 N.Y.2d 160, 287
N.Y.S.2d 14, 234 N.E.2d 199 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1039 (1968).
69. 341 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965).
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tect ... against the limit[ed] liability."' 70 In Mertens, the passenger
ticket was delivered to the plaintiff when he was already in the air;
thus, the passenger had no opportunity to take precautionary meas-
ures against the limitation by purchasing additional insurance or con-
tracting separately with the carrier.7' According to the appellate
court, this delivery did not satisfy the basic requirements of Article
3(2); therefore, the air carrier was not protected by the Convention
liability limitations.
72
The Ninth Circuit in Warren v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc.,73 contin-
ued the Mertens line of reasoning. In Warren, the passenger received
his ticket at the foot of the ramp to the plane, which the court found
was too late for adequate "delivery." ' 74 The Warren court reiterated
the Second Circuit's holding that Article 3(2) implies a requirement
that the carrier deliver the ticket sufficiently in advance of the flight to
allow the passenger to obtain additional insurance protection. 75 The
Ninth Circuit went even further in dicta, stating that the delivered
ticket must also contain all the particulars of Article 3(l)(a)-(e), in-
cluding a statement warning of the Convention liability limitations, to
satisfactorily meet the requirements of Article 3(2) delivery. 76
Finally, in 1966, the Second Circuit, affirmed by a divided
Supreme Court, held in Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane77 that in
order to satisfy Article 3(2)'s delivery requirement, the carrier had to
provide passengers with tickets containing notice of liability in print
size that was "readable. ' 78 The court held that "unreadable" print
size would defeat the purpose of the delivery requirement. 79 In Lisi,
the air carrier printed the statement of liability in 4-point type notice
which the court found to be unreadable because it was "camouflaged
70. Id. at 856.
71. Id. at 857-58.
72. Id. at 858.
73. 352 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1965).
74. Id. at 498.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 496. The requirements of Article 3(1) include: (a) the place and date of issue,
(b) the place of departure and destination, (c) the agreed stopping places, (d) the name and
address of the carrier, and (e) a statement that the transportation is subject to Convention
liability limitations. Convention, supra note 4, at 1226.
77. 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966), aff'd by an equally divided court, 390 U.S. 455 (1968).
78. Id. at 514.
79. Id. The court defined this "readable" standard in the negative. Id. Readable is not
notice "camouflaged in Lilliputian print in a thicket of 'Conditions of Contract' " or state-
ments that are "virtually invisible" or "ineffectively positioned, diminutively sized, and
unemphasized by bold face type, contrasting color, or anything else." Id. Therefore, "unread-
able" means words that are "so artfully camouflaged that their presence is concealed." Id.
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in Lilliputian print" which was not discernible to any reasonable pas-
senger.80 The ticket was thus not properly "delivered" as required by
Article 3(2) and deprived the airline of its limited liability. 8'
Two subsequent appellate decisions further refined the notice re-
quirement: the 1973 case, Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft v.
Civil Aeronautics Board8 2 and the 1983 decision in In re Air Crash
Disaster at Warsaw, Pol., on March 14, 1980.83 Lufthansa held that
the CAB regulation requiring 10-point type notice gave substantive
effect to the protections of Article 3(l)(e).84 Therefore, a passenger
who did not receive 10-point type notice did not receive adequate no-
tice; thus, the carrier was not protected by the Convention's limited
liability.85 In the In re Warsaw case, the passengers received notice in
8.5-point type, but the court found this notice inadequate. The court
held that the appropriate notice standard was the 10-point type speci-
fied in both the Montreal Agreement and the CAB regulation. 6
Thus, from 1965 through 1986,87 the United States courts interpreted
Article 3 of the Warsaw Convention to require adequate notice of the
liability limitations. Under this standard, omission of the liability
statement triggered the sanction of loss of these protections.
However, the Chan majority rejected this line of reasoning under
its plain meaning interpretation. First, the Court held that the plain
meaning of the treaty did not support the conclusions of the precedent
cases.88 The majority reasoned that inadequate notice is not a compo-
nent of delivery, but rather an irregularity which does not affect the
application of Convention limitations.89 Second, the Court rejected
the appellate precedent because the interpretations produced "ab-
surd" results. 90 The Court reasoned that if the prior appellate inter-
pretations were valid, the limitation sanction would apply to a
carrier's failure to include any of the particulars listed in Article
80. Id.
81. Id. at 511.
82. 479 F.2d 912 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
83. 705 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1983). Additionally, In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orle-
ans, La. on July 9, 1982, 789 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1986), followed the result of In re Warsaw
and adopted the Second Circuit's reasoning as its own. In re New Orleans, 789 F.2d at 1098.
84. Lufthansa, 479 F.2d at 918.
85. Id.
86. In re Warsaw, 705 F.2d at 89-91.
87. See cases cited supra note 68.
88. Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1680.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1681.
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3(l)(e).91 Thus, a carrier could lose its liability protection for failure
to provide something as minor as the carrier's address. 92 According
to the majority, such a result would be "absurd" and unduly harsh
since the plain meaning of the treaty did not articulate such a
sanction. 93
The majority concluded that because the plain meaning of the
Convention text was clear, the Court had no authority to review the
legislative history nor any power to insert a requirement of adequate,
10-point type notice.94 Therefore, after Chan, a carrier may still take
advantage of the Convention's protective damage limitations, even
when it fails to provide the passenger with adequate, 10-point type
notice of these limitations."
B. The Concurrence
Justice Brennan, joined by three other concurring Justices, ar-
gued that the Convention's drafting history plausibly supported the
petitioner's argument that the Convention denied benefits to a carrier
which failed to provide notice of the Convention limitations.96 Justice
Brennan acknowledged that, "[o]ver the last 25 years petitioners' ar-
gument has been accepted, until the present litigation, by virtually
every court in this country that has considered it."'97 However, the
concurring Justices agreed with the majority's result because they
stated that strict adherence to the 10-point type standard was not re-
quired by either the Montreal Agreement or the CAB regulation.98
First, Justice Brennan found that the plain language of Article 3
was susceptible to plausible interpretations other than the definition
derived by the majority. 99 One possible interpretation was that the
Article 3(2) term "passenger ticket" could be shorthand for the longer
phrase, a "ticket with all the particulars required by the conven-
tion."' 0 A second possibility was that the text of Article 3(2) regard-
ing the "irregularity" of a ticket could still require that the
91. Id. at 1681-82.
92. Id. at 1682.
93. Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1681-82.
94. Id. at 1683-84.
95. Id. at 1684.
96. Id. at 1685 n.4, 1687, 1693 (Brennan, J., concurring, Marshall, J., Blackmun, J., Ste-
vens, J., joining).
97. Id. at 1684.
98. Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1692.
99. Id. at 1685.
100. Id. at 1685, 1690 n.13.
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transportation be governed by the "rules" of the Convention. 10
Under such an interpretation, when an "irregularity" occurs, the con-
tract for transportation still exists because the intent of Article 3(2) is
to hold the carrier responsible for its obligations, but deny it the bene-
fits of the Convention if it omits any of the enumerated particulars. 0 2
The concurrence found both of the above interpretations, as well
as the majority's interpretation, to be plausible readings of the plain
meaning of the text. 10 3 Thus, the only way for Justice Brennan to
construe the true meaning of the Convention was to look to other
interpretive sources, such as the drafters' intent104 The drafting his-
tory of the Warsaw Convention illustrates the drafters' intent that
sanctions apply to an air carrier which fails to comply with the enu-
merated particulars of a passenger ticket.10° The original, final draft
of Article 3 read, in pertinent part:
The passenger ticket shall contain, moreover, a clause stipu-
lating that the carriage is subject to the system of liability set forth
by the present Convention.
The absence, irregularity, or loss of this document of carriage
shall not prejudice either the existence or the validity of the con-
tract of carriage.
If, for international carriage, the carrier accepts the traveler
without having drawn up a passenger ticket, or if the ticket does not
contain the particulars indicated hereabove.... the contract of car-
riage shall nonetheless be subject to the rules of the present Con-
vention, but the carrier shall not have the right to avail himself of
the provisions of this Convention which exclude in all or in part his
direct liability or that derived from the faults of his servants. 
1 6
Additionally, the drafters intended uniform application of sanctions
for Article 3 personal injury limitations, Article 4 baggage limitations,
and Article 9 air freight limitations. 0 7 Therefore, the drafters did in-
101. Justice Brennan made this argument to counter the majority's assertion that a ticket
with inadequate notice was merely an "irregularity" which did not trigger Convention sanc-
tions. Id. at 1680, 1685.
102. Id. at 1685.
103. Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1684-85.
104. Id. at 1686. The concurrence found that the majority's inability to accept this point
"results precisely from the misplaced literalism and disregard of context already evident in [the
majority's] approach to this treaty." Id. at 1686 n.5.
105. Id. at 1686.
106. SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE AERONAUTICAL LAW MIN-
UTES: WARSAW, 1929 258-59 (R. Homer & D. Legrez trans. 1975) [hereinafter Homer &
Legrez] (emphasis added).
107. Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1686. The original minutes of the Convention stated:
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tend to sanction air carriers for failure to adequately comply with the
Convention's notice provisions. 10 8
However, this original language of the Convention's final draft
did not appear in the signed treaty due to two politically-motivated
amendments. The first amendment was proposed by the Japanese del-
egation. The Japanese wanted to physically reorder the liability limi-
tation clause as an enumerated subsection rather than leaving it as a
separate, free-standing paragraph at the bottom of Article 3.1°9 They
felt that this mechanical change would emphasize that the liability
clause was obligatory and that omission of the clause would result in
loss of the limited liability."10 The Greek delegation proposed a sec-
ond amendment directed at all of the limitation sanctions in Articles
3, 4, and 9. The Greeks believed that the sanctions were too harsh. III
They thought that a mere clerical omission of a date or address
should not deprive an airline of the protective limitations. 1 2 The
Greek delegates proposed that the particulars which could trigger the
sanction be clearly enumerated in order to avoid harsh results. 11 Yet
the Greek delegates believed a sanction would be justified in those
cases where the omission of a particular would endanger the passen-
ger.1 4 However, inexplicably, only part of the Greek proposal was
integrated into the text of Article 3; thus, their clear intent to sanction
A special document is provided for carriage of passengers. This document is
necessarily different from those used for carriage of baggage and the circulation of
goods.
This baggage ticket must contain only a minimum of particulars.
Moreover, the sanction provided for for [sic] carriage of passengers without a
ticket or with a ticket not conforming to the Convention is identical to that provided
for, for [sic] carriage of baggage and goods.
Homer & Legrez, supra note 106, at 247.
108. Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1687. The concurrence argues that the imposition of this sanction
for inadequate notice is not, as the majority asserts, absurd, because this was the method the
drafters chose to compel adherence to the ticket requirements. Other methods of compelling
adherence, such as criminal or civil penalties, were rejected by the drafters as too severe.
Homer & Legrez, supra note 106, at 247. The drafters chose the sanction as a means to
enforce the provisions of the Convention and thus accomplish the overall Convention goal of
establishing uniformity in international aviation law.
109. Homer & Legrez, supra note 106, at 310; compare supra note 19 and accompanying
text with text accompanying supra note 106 (original and final versions of Article 3 of the
Convention).
110. Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1689; see also Horner & Legrez, supra note 106, at 310.
111. Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1689.
112. Homer & Legrez, supra note 106, at 303. The Greeks felt that omissions such as the
failure to state the point of departure or the passenger's name or address were unimportant
because they were already known or easily known to the passenger. Id
113. Id.
114. Id.
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potentially dangerous omissions failed to appear in the final treaty.' 15
These two political proposals resulted in an incoherent treaty.
The drafters enumerated the liability statement, as suggested by the
Japanese, and as requested by the Greeks, replaced the vague sanction
language to indicate specified particulars which triggered the sanc-
tions.11 6 However, the drafters did not adopt the entire Greek propo-
sal and failed to reconcile the gap these two amendments created
when merged together in the same document.117 This faulty integra-
tion caused the concurrence to conclude that the absence of a specific
sanction for inadequate notice of the personal injury limitation was a
mere drafting error on the part of the original delegates.118 Since the
plain text of the treaty was defective, the drafters' original intentions
should be given weight when interpreting the Convention. The legis-
lative history revealed that the drafters intended to sanction the air-
lines for failure to adequately notify passengers of the Convention's
liability limitations.'1 9
After concluding that the legislative history supported a sanction
for inadequate notice, the concurrence analyzed whether there actu-
ally was adequate notice in this case. 120 The KAL passengers re-
ceived notice of the Convention limitations in 8-point type print.12
1
The concurrence held that no formal requirement of 10-point type
notice existed as long as actual, adequate notice was received by the
passengers.1 22 Yet, Justice Brennan acknowledged that some mini-
mum standard of notice was still required: "I think one must agree as
well that notice that is not minimally legible, at the least, is not notice
at all."1 23 However, no precise standard or formula for determining
minimum standards for adequate notice emerged from the concurring
opinion. The concurrence's final holding was that 8-point type notice
was not inadequate merely because the Montreal Agreement specified
a 10-point type standard; thus, KAL was entitled to the Convention
liability protections.
24
115. Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1689; see supra note 19 and accompanying text.
116. Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1689.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1693.
120. Id. at 1691.
121. Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1693.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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V. ANALYSIS: TREATY INTERPRETATION AND INVALIDITY
A. Justice Scalia's New Textualism
In construing the treaty for the Chan majority, Justice Scalia ex-
amined only the plain meaning of the Convention text and refused to
consider any other peripheral sources, such as the legislative his-
tory.125 Justice Scalia's interpretation philosophy departs from tradi-
tional statutory and treaty construction which permits consideration
of sources outside the text, such as legislative histories, committee re-
ports, and subsequent actions, in order to derive the true meaning of
the original text. 126 Instead, Justice Scalia's New Textualism 127 looks
only to the "plain meaning" of the treaty or statute when construing
its language.128 For the new textualists, the "plain meaning" consists
125. Id. at 1683-84.
126. Eskridge, The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990). Under a traditional
approach to statutory interpretation, the Court has attempted to implement the original intent
or purpose of the enacting Congress. Id. at 626. Legislative history is utilized either to supply
meaning for an ambiguous statute or to confirm or rebut the plain meaning of a clear statute.
Id. A variety of relevant legislative history is used, including: committee reports, sponsor
statements, rejected proposals, floor and hearing colloquy, views of bureaucrats and law
professors, legislative inaction and silence, and subsequent legislative history. Id. at 626, 636.
The leading case exemplifying this traditional approach is Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,
437 U.S. 153 (1978). Eskridge, supra, at 628. In Hill, the Court only briefly discussed the
textual arguments, and instead, carefully examined the language, history, and structure of the
relevant legislation. Eskridge, supra, at 628. The practical effect of the traditional approach is
the perpetuation of the "soft plain meaning rule" which suggests that strongly contradictory
legislative history can trump the plain meaning of the text. Id.
127. The term "New Textualism" was coined by Professor Eskridge. Eskridge, supra note
126, at 623. New Textualism posits that once the Court has ascertained a statute's plain mean-
ing, consideration of legislative history becomes irrelevant. Id. Legislative history should not
be consulted even to confirm the apparent meaning of a statutory text. Id. Justice Scalia
argues that his interpretation philosophy is merely a return to the Court's traditional, nine-
teenth century approach to statutory interpretation. Id. at 623 n. 11, 624 n. 12. However, Jus-
tice Scalia's philosophy is new because his theory incorporates the intellectual inspirations of
public choice theory, strict separation of powers, and ideological conservatism. Id. at 623
n. 11. Justice Scalia's New Textualism is a radical critique and an analytically bold rethinking
of the Court's role in statutory interpretation. Id. at 624.
128. Id. at 623. For cases in which Justice Scalia has articulated or applied his theory of
New Textualism, see H. J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893, 2907 (1989)
(Scalia, J., concurring); Jett v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 109 S. Ct. 2702, 2724 (1989) (Scalia,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas. Co., 109 S.
Ct. 2273, 2295-96 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Green v. Bock
Laundry Mach. Co., 109 S. Ct. 1981, 1994-95 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); United States v.
Stuart, 109 S. Ct. 1183, 1193-95 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); Blanchard v. Bergeron, 109 S.
Ct. 939, 946-47 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); United
States v. Taylor, 108 S. Ct. 2413, 2423-24 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part); K Mart Corp.
v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 318-29 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 188 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring); Edwards v.
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of the text of the treaty on its face, applicable canons of construc-
tion,129 and structural comparisons of the internal sections of a
treaty. 3 0 Under this strict philosophy, the Court may use only these
three interpretive aids to construe the language of a treaty or statute.
In Chan, Justice Scalia rigidly followed his new textualist ap-
proach to interpreting treaties. His initial examination of the Conven-
tion found that Article 3(2) did not specifically penalize the air carrier
for failure to notify the passenger in 10-point type.13' Justice Scalia
then examined other comparable provisions of the Convention relat-
ing to air freight and baggage carriage which specifically penalized the
failure to include adequate notice on the travel documentation.
32
From this examination, Justice Scalia concluded that the presence of
such a sanction for freight and baggage emphasized the absence of the
sanction for personal injury limitations. That absence indicated to
Justice Scalia the drafters' intent that no sanction apply to the per-
sonal injury limitation. 33 Finally, Justice Scalia relied on the canon
"inclusio unius est exclusio alterius" (the inclusion of one thing im-
plies the exclusion of all others).134 This was Justice Scalia's key argu-
ment for the Chan majority: Because Article 3(2) did not explicitly
provide for negation of the liability limits for failure to provide proper
notice, and because other sections of the same Convention did provide
such an explicit remedy, Justice Scalia inferred that the statute plainly
meant to deny a remedy for the right to notice.1
35
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 510, 636-39 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Citicorp Indus. Credit, Inc. v.
Brock, 483 U.S. 27, 40 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring); Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 640-44
(1987) (Scalia, J., concurring); Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 670-72 (1987)
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,
452-54 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring); California Fed. Says. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S.
272, 295-96 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
129. Eskridge, supra note 126, at 662-63. Canons of statutory construction are historical,
arbitrary rules of thumb for interpreting statutes. Iai The new textualists seek to revive the
historic canons that rest upon precepts of grammar and logic, proceduralism, and federalism.
Id. However, the new textualists reject any of the more modem canons which utilize substan-
tive policy and public values to interpret statutes and treaties. Id.
130. Justice Scalia considers arguments based upon textual, or horizontal coherence-
showing that the meaning is consistent with other parts of the statute or other terms in similar
statutes-but prohibits arguments based on vertical coherence-that the meaning is consistent
with the historical expectations of the authors of the statute. Id. at 655, 661-63; see also United
States v. Taylor, 108 S. Ct. 2413, 2424 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part) (Justice Scalia's
statement of his horizontal coherence approach).
131. Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1680.
132. Id. at 1682-83.
133. Id.
134. Eskridge, supra note 126, at 664.
135. Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1683; Eskridge, supra note 126, at 664.
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Justice Scalia supports his New Textualism with both realist and
formalist theories. 136 First, he argues that New Textualism is a realis-
tic approach to statutory interpretation which acknowledges that
there is no "collective intent" of a legislative body.' 37 Each legislator
acts upon his or her own political motivations and intentions; thus, it
is a fallacy to believe that "collective intent" can clarify the statutory
language. 138 Only the exact language of a statute is voted on by the
legislature; Congress does not vote on the reports or minutes gener-
ated by drafting committees. 139 Furthermore, only the exact language
of the statute is subject to the constitutional requirements of bicamer-
alism and presentment. 140 Therefore, the judiciary can use only the
plain language of the text, and not the legislative speeches and min-
utes, to interpret a statute.1
4 '
New Textualism is also supported by Justice Scalia on formalistic
grounds. According to Justice Scalia, the judiciary usurps legislative
and executive power by modifying or abrogating a statute. 42 In
Chan, Justice Scalia condemned the appellate precedent's broad inter-
pretation of the Convention as judicial activism which exceeded the
courts' constitutional power. ,43 According to their critics, the appel-
late courts did not like the inequitable impact of the $8,300 personal
136. Eskridge, supra note 126, at 642-46.
137. Id. at 642-44.
138. Id. Max Radin, a Legal Realist, argued that the collective intent of a legislature is a
legal fiction, easily subject to any interpretation. Id. at 642 (citing Radin, Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863 (1930)). According to Radin, a legislature has no determinate,
collective expectations about many of the concrete issues in its statutes. This lack of coherent
expectations is due to the great number of people whose intent must be discovered and the
muteness of most of these legislators in the legislative process. Id. Radin's analysis demon-
strates that an interpreter can deconstruct almost any legislative intent argument through pre-
dictable analytical moves. Id.
139. Id. at 642; Fein, Scalia's Way, A.B.A. J. 38 (Feb. 1990).
140. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. This constitutional requirement mandates that a bill
must be passed in the same form by both chambers of Congress and must then be presented to
the President. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). Legisla-
tive history is therefore "[a] frail substitute for bicameral vote upon the text of a law and its
presentment to the President. It is at best dangerous to assume that all the necessary partici-
pants in the law-enactment process are acting upon the same unexpressed assumptions."
Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 192 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing and relying
on Chadha).
141. Eskridge, supra note 126, at 650, 654; Fein, supra note 139, at 38.
142. Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1684; Eskridge, supra note 126, at 646, 653. For Justice Scalia's
views on the formal separation of powers, see Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 675-82
(1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2622-41 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374 (D.D.C. 1986) (per curiam) (three-judge
court opinion, including Scalia, J.), aff'd sub nom Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
143. Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1684.
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injury limitation on American plaintiffs and distorted the terms of the
treaty to reach the result they desired.'" What Justice Scalia labels
as judicial activism has traditionally been called "judicial
treatywriting."145
[T]his Court does not possess any treaty-making power. That
power belongs by the constitution to another department of the
Government; and to alter, amend, or add to any treaty, by in-
serting any clause, whether small or great, important or trivial
would be on our part an usurpation of power, and not an exercise
of judicial functions. It would be to make, and not to construe a
treaty. Neither can this Court supply a casus omissus in a treaty,
any more than in a law. We are to find out the intention of the
parties by just rules of interpretation applied to the subject matter;
and having found that, our duty is to follow it as far as it goes, and
to stop where that stops-whatever may be the imperfections or
difficulties which it leaves behind.'"6
According to Justice Scalia, judicial treatywriting is outside of the
Court's power; instead, any desired change in a statute must be insti-
gated through the political process.147 New Textualism purports to
144. Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, 370 F.2d 508, 515 (2d Cir. 1966) (Moore, J.,
dissenting). "The majority in their opinion indulge in judicial treaty-making .... The majority
do not approve of the terms of the treaty and, therefore, by judicial fiat they rewrite it." Id.;
see also Note, supra note 30, at 160-61.
145. Judicial treatywriting is defined as the judicial proclivity to rewrite those troublesome
sections of a treaty that the political branches have been unable to change. Note, supra note
30, at 160-61. This judicial activism was first condemned by Judge Moore in his dissent in the
Lisi case. 370 F.2d at 515. Judge Moore criticized,
[t]he original limitations in the Convention may well be outmoded by now. Substan-
tial revisions upward have been made but they have been made, as they should be, by
treaty and not by the courts. Judicial predilection for their own views as to limita-
tion of liability should not prevail over the limitations fixed by the legislative and
executive branches of Government even though this result is obtained by ostensibly
adding to the treaty a requirement of actual understanding notice.
Id. The term "judicial treatywriting" is a term that is often manipulated by one side of a court
to criticize the treaty interpretation of the opposing opinion. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 263-64 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens
accused the majority of judicial treatywriting in the Franklin Mint case because it upheld a
CAB regulation regarding the valuation of air freight damage instead of the standard set out in
the Convention itself. Id. at 262-63. However, by joining the concurrence in Chan, Justice
Stevens was accused by the majority of engaging in judicial treatywriting. 109 S. Ct. at 1683-
84. Thus, the label "judicial treatywriting" is a manipulable accusation and not an inherently
negative action by the Court.
146. The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1, 71 (1821).
147. Eskridge, supra note 126, at 646, 648. Justice Scalia argues that in a representative
democracy, the popularly elected branches of government should make the major policy deci-
sions. Id. at 648. Unelected judges should make as few policy choices as possible, especially
when interpreting statutes. Id. When the judge uses legislative history, especially to alter the
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curb judicial discretion and personal activism, thus maintaining a
nonpartisan bench.148 Furthermore, the formalistic philosophy forces
Congress to be more careful in drafting legislation because Congress
learns that the courts will no longer guess at the meaning of statutory
language. 149 Thus, Justice Scalia's philosophy is aimed at reducing
politically-motivated judicial activism and strengthening the tradi-
tional separation and allocation of constitutional powers.150
However, Justice Scalia's rationales for New Textualism are not
persuasive when applied to international treaties. First, contrary to
Justice Scalia's assertion, the plain meaning of the Convention text is
not clear. The Convention was originally drafted in French and has
undergone many subsequent translations.' 5 l Thus, the technical
meaning of many of the original words may have been lost in the
translation process. Furthermore, the original drafting of the docu-
ment was not founded on accepted American judicial assumptions.
The international forum is not necessarily familiar with American ca-
nons of construction; thus, a court cannot assume that the language is
amenable to United States rules of grammar and drafting proce-
dure. 152 Delegates from different legal and social cultures may not all
apparent textual meaning, she has increased her discretion to make illegitimate policy choices.
Id. This broadening of the judicial inquiry through the use of legislative history, beyond the
relatively concrete analysis of what the actual words of the statute mean, permits the Court to
justify a broader range of answers and facilitates the Justices writing their own preferences into
the statute. Id.
148. Id. at 654, 656. New Textualism limits the tools available to judges seeking to escape
plain statutory meaning, thereby curtailing opportunities for judicial lawmaking. Id
149. Id. at 654-55.
[Flor Justice Scalia. ... the Court not only has a negative duty to police against
lawmaking by legislative subgroups, but also has a positive duty to encourage Con-
gress to legislate more carefully, so as to obtain the benefits of the bicameralism and
presentment requirements. "It should not be possible, or at least should not be easy,
to be sure of obtaining a particular result in this Court without making that result
apparent on the face of the bill which both Houses consider and vote upon, which the
President approves, and which, if it becomes law, the people must obey," argues
Justice Scalia. "I think we have an obligation to conduct our exegesis in a fashion
which fosters that democratic process."
Id. at 655.
150. Justice Scalia argues that a textual focus reduces the possibility of judicial usurpation
of Congress' lawmaking responsibilities by curtailing judges' discretion to impose their own
values onto the statute itself. Id. at 654. Additionally, Justice Scalia emphasizes the func-
tional efficiency advantages of his New Textualism approach. Id. at 656. His interpretive
theory will eliminate the need for practitioners and judges to engage in the unnecessary and
expensive search through legislative history, thus saving the Court and the parties valuable
time. Id.
151. See Homer & Legrez, supra note 106 (1975 translation of original French text).
152. The canons used by the Court are based on notions of American Federalism. Es-
kridge, supra note 126, at 665. These domestic rules of construction are based upon the na-
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ascribe the same meaning to a treaty. 153 In order to give substantive
meaning to vague terms, many delegate nations rely on their own do-
mestic courts to interpret these treaties according to their domestic
laws.1 54 Therefore, Justice Scalia's main premise for reliance on New
Textualism, the uncontroverted clarity of the text, is not present in an
international treaty context.
Second, in the international convention arena, an injured passen-
ger cannot resort to the majoritarian process for relief. Justice
Scalia's alternative route of resorting to the political process is im-
practicable for international treaties, as the international forum does
not contain the usual accessible components of a democratic process.
Primarily, there is no single, international legislative body that is ac-
cessible to all voters. Furthermore, these voters are unable to elect
representative members to the international forum because political
persons have never been involved in the Convention's history. Tradi-
tionally, only appointed executive officers and bureaucrats have been
responsible for the implementation and drafting of the treaties and
agreements. 55 International travelers are also an ineffective lobbying
group because their exposure to the Convention occurs only in the
unlikely event of an air crash.156 Similarly, the general public, una-
ware of the Convention's existence, is an ineffective lobbying group.
Without access to an international legislative body, either through a
representative, direct vote, or a lobby group, individuals are unable to
resort to the political process to effectuate change in the Convention.
In the absence of this political alternative, the courts should not refuse
to adjudicate on the merits of the treaty.
Finally, Justice Scalia argues that the Court will exceed its con-
stitutional powers if it looks beyond the plain meaning of the
treaty. 157 However, an acceptable, indeed mandatory, power of the
tion's federal system of government, with its division of responsibilities among national, state,
and local governments. Id. Obviously, such notions of federalism are not common in all na-
tions; thus, these American canons of construction cannot be assumed to operate in the inter-
national legislative forum.
153. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 22, at 35; Eskridge, supra note 126, at 662
n. 166 (noting that the relevant intent in Chan would be that of several nations, not just the
intent of the United States).
154. See Ludecke v. Canadian Pac. Airlines Ltd., 98 D.L.R.3d 52 (Can. 1979); Coccia v.
Turkish Airlines, Co., (Italy 1955), excerpted in Guerreri, The Warsaw System Italian Style:
Convention Without Limits, 10 AIR L. 294, 297 (1985) [hereinafter Coccia].
155. Homer & Legrez, supra note 106, at 5-10.
156. Jeffrey, The Growth of American Judicial Hostility Towards the Liability Limitations
of the Warsaw Convention, 48 J. AIR L. & COM. 805, 833 (1982).
157. Eskridge, supra note 126, at 646, 648, 653; see supra note 147 and accompanying text.
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judiciary is to examine the constitutionality of the acts of the other
branches of government. 58 A treaty is one such governmental act
which cannot abridge the rights and guarantees of the Constitution. 59
The Chan concurrence's approach of examining legislative history in
order to determine a treaty's meaning is the traditional method of
treaty interpretation.160 Other legal scholars closely aligned with Jus-
tice Scalial 6l suggest that treaties should be examined in light of the
public choices the drafters would make if they were drafting the same
treaty in today's world. 62 This "imaginative reconstruction" requires
the judiciary to examine the policy choices made by the original draft-
ers to see if they are viable and constitutional in the modern world. 63
Under the traditional interpretation and the imaginative reconstruc-
tion theories, the Court has the power to review the validity of a
treaty and make any necessary modifications. 64 Thus, the Court
would not exceed its constitutional powers by closely examining the
1929 Convention.
B. Alternative Construction Theories
The majority's use of New Textualism to interpret the Conven-
tion is also a rigid departure from the Court's own statements of rules
158. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); see also Jeffrey, supra note 156, at
832.
159. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
160. For a description of the traditional approach, see supra note 126 and accompanying
text; see also Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1685-90 (concurrence's application of the traditional
approach).
161. Judges Learned Hand and Richard Posner have advocated this theory of "imagina-
tive reconstruction." Eskridge, supra note 126, at 630. Others closely aligned with Justice
Scalia's New Textualism, but not joining in the imaginative reconstruction school of thought,
include: Justice Anthony Kennedy, Judge Frank Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit, Judge
James Buckley of the District of Columbia Circuit, Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit,
and former Judge Kenneth Starr, now Solicitor Counsel of the United States. Id. at 647, 657
n. 137.
162. Id. at 630.
163. Id. Under the imaginative reconstruction approach, the Court will trace the evolu-
tion of the statute and its debating history, from early legislative proposals to enactment, with
a focus on the interpretive issue in the case. Id. The goal of the judicial inquiry is to retrieve
specific legislative consideration of the issue and more importantly, to recreate the general
assumptions, goals, and limitations of the enacting Congress. Id.; see Immigration & Naturali-
zation Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (Court's application of the imaginative
reconstruction theory).
164. Eskridge, supra note 126, at 626. "ITmhe plain meaning rule has traditionally been a
'soft' rule-the plainest meaning can be trumped by contradictory legislative history .... Id.
"Through [imaginative reconstruction], the Court seeks to "reconstruct" the answer the enact-
ing Congress would have given if the interpretive issue had been posed directly." Id. at 630.
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for treaty interpretation. Those rules support the broad construction
of treaties in order to effectuate the international intent of the foreign
drafters. 65 In 1989, the Court in United States v. Stuart 1 66 held that
treaties should generally be "broadly and reasonably construed to ac-
complish the obvious purposes of the framers."1 67 Additionally,
"where a provision of a treaty fairly admits of two constructions, one
restricting, the other enlarging rights which may be claimed under it,
the more liberal interpretation is to be preferred."'' 68 Thus, in accord-
ance with its own articulated principles of treaty construction in Stu-
art, the Court could have applied a traditional interpretation
approach to the Convention, which would have provided for an ex-
pansive, liberal reading of the treaty. 69
Before Stuart, the Court developed a specific formula to give
these general treaty construction principles some practical effect.170
In Air France v. Saks,'7 1 the Court held that a strict, literal reading of
a treaty is superficial and therefore, the Court must use additional
interpretive aids to determine the meaning of the Convention. 72
According to Saks, the significant aids that the Court should refer to
include: 1) the language of the treaty itself and its context within the
entire treaty, 173 2) the legal meaning of the original French text,'
74
3) the preparatory treaty work, including the minutes and debates of
the delegates, 75 4) the case law of sister signatories, 76 and 5) the
165. See United States v. Stuart, 109 S. Ct. 1183 (1989); Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392
(1985).
166. 109 S. Ct. 1183 (1989).
167. Id. at 1192.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985).
171. Id. The Court considered a provision of the Warsaw Convention which required that
an "accident" cause the passenger's injury in order to excuse the airline of liability. Id at 397.
The Court first looked to the plain text and context of the Warsaw Convention to define the
term "accident" contained in Article 17 of the Convention. Id. at 397, 399. Finding two
possible meanings for "accident" in the text, the Court proceeded to consider the French legal
meaning of the word. Id. at 399. Finally, the Court examined the detailed negotiating history,
and the post-ratification conduct and case law of sister signatory countries. Id. at 400. Based
on this full analysis, the Court concluded that "accident" referred to an injury caused by an
unexpected or unusual event or happening external to the passenger. Id. at 405.
172. Id. at 396.
173. Id. at 397.
174. Id. at 399.
175. Saks, 470 U.S. at 400.
176. Id.
[Vol. 1 :95
Licensed to Limit Without Notice
post-ratification actions of the signatories. 177 Had the Chan Court
followed the Saks formula, it clearly would have held that the Con-
vention provides sanctions for an airline's failure to give adequate
notice.
Arguably, the Court did engage in the first two steps of the
formula by looking at the specific wording of Article 3 on its face and
in relation to other Convention provisions. 178 Although the Court did
not discuss the meaning of the original French words, it did rely on
official translations of the French text, which presumably incorporate
any additional French legal meaning which could be derived. 17 9 The
majority ended its discussion here, but the concurrence went further
and examined in detail the minutes and debates of the Convention
drafters. 80 At that point, the majority and the concurrence reached
opposite conclusions as to the meaning of the treaty.' 8 ' Because of
this polarity, both opinions should have applied the Saks formula in
its entirety to derive the true meaning of Article 3.
Although the majority skipped the third step of the Saks
formula-examining the framers' intent-it partially followed the
fourth step--examining the case law of sister signatories-by looking
to a Canadian case, Ludecke v. Canadian Pacific Airlines Ltd..182
The court in Ludecke held that the plain meaning of Article 3(2) indi-
cated that the Convention did not mandate sanctions for notice of the
liability statement printed in 4.5-point type. 18 3 The Chan majority
used the Ludecke case to support its strict, textualist approach to
treaty interpretation. 8 4  However, upon examining its facts, the
Ludecke reasoning is not persuasive. Although the Canadian court
rigidly adhered to the plain language rule in order to uphold a 4.5-
177. Id; see also Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co. Ltd., 351 F. Supp. 702 (1972), aff'd,
485 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1973).
178. Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1680, 1682.
179. Id. at 1685 n.4.
180. Id. at 1685.
181. Id. at 1683-84, 1691. The majority concluded that the plain meaning of the text, in
context with the rest of the treaty, did not impose the severe sanction of forfeiture of the
liability protections for an airline which fails to give a passenger adequate notice of the Con-
vention's liability limitations. Id. at 1683-84. The concurrence stated that there were many
plausible interpretations of the Convention language, but concluded that the legislative history
indicated that the drafters intended to sanction the failure to provide adequate notice with
forfeiture of Convention protections. Id. at 1691.
182. 98 D.L.R.3d 52 (Can. 1979).
183. Id. at 57.
184. Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1684.
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point type notice of the Convention's liability statement,18 5 the United
States courts in Lisi ' 8 6 had already rejected 4-point type notice as un-
readable, inadequate notice.S7 Thus, even though the "plain lan-
guage" reasoning of the Canadian court persuaded the Chan majority,
the Ludecke result validating 4.5-point type notice may not be accept-
able to the Court in light of its rejection of 4-point type notice in
Lisi.'18 Therefore, the import of the Canadian court's reasoning
should not weigh heavily in the Court's interpretation of the
Convention.
The majority concluded its examination of other international
case law with Ludecke.8 9 However, in order to effectively utilize the
case law of sister signatories, a court should examine the case law of
all parallel and participating nations to derive the universally under-
stood "true" meaning of the text. 190 For example, had the Chan ma-
jority considered Italian case law it would have learned that the
Italian courts have taken a completely different approach than the
Canadian judiciary. 91 In Coccia v. Turkish Airlines, the Italian Con-
stitutional Court invalidated the Convention and Hague Protocol lim-
its as unconstitutional. 92 The Italian court found that the liability
limits were no longer justified by any need to give special protection to
the airlines. 93 This sister signatory expansively interpreted the Con-
vention language and held that the Convention itself was no longer
valid under Italian law. 94
However, the comparison, of international case law does not nec-
essarily resolve the conflicting interpretations, as the signatory coun-
tries have interpreted the Convention in opposite ways.195 Therefore,
in order to clarify the Convention's meaning, the Court should apply
the fifth prong of the Saks analysis, examination of the post-ratifica-
tion actions of the signatories. 96 As illustrated above, Italy has to-
tally denounced both the Convention and the Hague Protocol as
185. Ludecke, 98 D.L.R.3d at 56-58.
186. 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966), aff'd by equally divided court, 390 U.S. 455 (1968).
187. Id. at 514.
188. See id.; see also Ludecke, 98 D.L.R.3d at 58.
189. Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1684.
190. In Saks, the Court examined a variety of cases from other countries, even those which
were not precisely on point or supportive of the Court's position. 470 U.S. at 404-05.
191. See Coccia, supra note 154.
192. Id. at 294.
193. Id. at 302.
194. Id. at 305.
195. See Ludecke, 98 D.L.R.3d at 56; Coccia, supra note 154, at 297.
196. Saks, 470 U.S. at 403.
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unconstitutional. 19 7 New Zealand, another signatory, has enacted na-
tional legislation that requires damages resulting from an interna-
tional transport with a New Zealand carrier, or involving a New
Zealand citizen, to be calculated according to the injured party's eco-
nomic earning potential. 98 Britain has raised its national liability
limit to 100,000 SDR.199 Even Korea, whose national airline is KAL,
raised its liability limit in 1984 to 100,000 SDR for litigation in Ko-
rea.200 These changes illustrate that other signatory nations are also
dissatisfied with the limits and terms of the Convention.
The United States' dissatisfaction with the Convention has been
apparent since 1935.201 The Hague Protocol, the Guatemala Proto-
col, and the recent Montreal Protocol were all rejected by the United
States because of their inadequate protections for United States pas-
sengers. 20 2 In 1964, the United States announced its intent to de-
nounce the Convention, which was only prevented by the signing of
the Montreal Agreement. 20 3 More specifically, the United States has
always been concerned with the Convention's liability limits and its
notice provision. 2°4 As early as the first Hague Protocol committee
discussions, the United States insisted on the addition of a clause
reading "if the passenger is not given a ticket containing the required
notice, the carrier loses its right to avail itself of the liability limiting
provisions of the Convention. ' 205 The United States and other signa-
tory nations are dissatisfied with the terms of the Convention; some
have even invalidated the Convention in its entirety. 2°6 Thus, the fifth
197. Coccia, supra note 154, at 305.
198. Vennell, International and Domestic Carriage by Air: The Effect of the New Zealand
Accident Compensation Scheme on Claims for Damages for Personal Injuries, 13 AIR L. 273
(1988). This economic calculation is determined on the basis of lost wages, number of depen-
dents, etc., the traditional method of computing tort damages. Id.
199. Cohen, supra note 31, at 157. An SDR ("Special Drawing Right") is a unit of ac-
count that is a measure derived from a basket of five national currencies. Id. at 156 n. 146. The
SDR has been proposed as a standard of exchange that would be more beneficial than the
current franc or gold standard formulas. Id.
200. Lee, The Current Status of the Warsaw Convention and Subsequent Protocols in Lead-
ing Asian Countries, 11 AIR L. 242 (1986). Most Asian countries were not original signatories
to the Convention. Id However, in 1955 Korea signed the Hague Protocol which amended
the Convention. Idl Most scholars find that a country which has signed the amendment to the
Convention has impliedly agreed to the unamended terms of the original Convention. Id.
201. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 22, at 502.
202. Id. at 514-16; Cohen, supra note 31, at 147; Matte, supra note 42, at 157.
203. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 22, at 563.
204. Id. at 507.
205. Id. at 513-14.
206. Italy has declared the limits of the Warsaw Convention unconstitutional. Coccia,
supra note 154, at 305.
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prong of the Saks analysis clarifies the Convention language: a ticket
with inadequate notice deprives the carrier of Convention liability
protections.
The full Saks analysis exposes the clear intent of the delegates
and signatories. The original purpose of the Convention was to grant
protective limits for the airlines, if the passenger was given adequate
notice.207 The two plausible interpretations of the Convention text,
derived by the Chan majority and the concurrence, 208 are clarified by
the minutes of the drafters and the post-ratification actions of the sig-
natories.209 The delegates intended that the passengers receive notice
of the liability limitations; failure to provide this notice was intended
to be penalized with loss of the protective liability limits.
2 10
C. Changed Circumstances and Constitutional Infirmities
Had the Chan Court moved beyond formalistic rules of construc-
tion and substantively examined the terms of the Convention, the
Court would have found that the Convention is unconstitutional in
light of present-day circumstances. In the 1990s, the reasons for the
1929 Convention are no longer justified.211 Originally, the liability
limitations were established to support the fledgling air industry by
encouraging business investment and airline entrepreneurs. 2 2 The
primary goal of the Convention was to create protections for the air
carriers so as to insulate them from attack and liability during the
industry's initial years. 213 The Convention drafters weighed the inter-
ests of the air carriers against the international passenger and clearly
decided to protect the carrier.
214
However, in the sixty years since the Convention's origin, there
has been a huge shift in that initial calculus. No longer do mammoth
businesses like the airlines need legal liability protections. 215 Air
safety has improved through the implementation of new technology;
207. This interpretation is based on the original final draft of Article 3, the subsequent
actions of Italy, New Zealand, and Britain, and the post-Convention attempts to amend the
inadequacies of the Convention. See text accompanying notes 104-108, 197-206.
208. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
209. See text accompanying notes 104-108, 197-206.
210. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 22, at 498.
211. Id. at 499.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 499-500.
214. Id.
215. Jeffrey, supra note 156, at 830; see also Coccia, supra note 154, at 302.
[I]n the 1920's there was a reason for the Warsaw Convention to protect the indus-
try. It needed protection and it deserved it. Now we are in 1982. We have flights to
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thus, the risk of carrier liability has substantially decreased. 216 Fur-
thermore, the availability and affordability of insurance allows the air-
lines to protect their business interests in the event of a large liability
situation. 21
7
Instead, it is the individual passenger facing the mammoth air-
lines who needs the protections of the law. For United States domes-
tic air travel, there are no liability restrictions placed on a passenger's
recovery. 218 Between 1970 and 1984, the average recovery per passen-
ger was $362,943.219 However, huge increases in recovery have oc-
curred with each year; in the 1980s, the average recovery rose to
$500,000.22° Based on these figures, the Convention limit of $75,000
is clearly insufficient to protect and compensate the injured passenger.
Because the airlines no longer need liability protection, and because
the individual traveler has increased need for legal protection, the
Court's rigid adherence to an antiquated treaty is both unnecessary
and inequitable. 22
!
Eradicating this antiquated treaty without the Court exceeding
the moon. We have 747s. We have Concordes and the airline industry, we all agree,
is the safest method of transportation that we know.
Podgers, supra note 52, at 30.
216. Jeffrey, supra note 156, at 810, 819; see also In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia on April
22, 1974, 684 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1982); Coccia, supra note 154, at 302.
217. See In re Bali, 684 F.2d at 1310; see also Burdell v. Canadian Pac. Airlines, 10 Av.
Cas. (CCH) 18, 158-60 (Cir. Ct. Ill. 1968) (later revised by 11 Av. Cas. 17, (CCH) 351 (1969)).
"As a general rule, American tort law does not shield healthy, insurable industries from the
duty to compensate persons injured in the course of business." Jeffrey, supra note 156, at 832.
218. Jeffrey, supra note 156, at 805-06.
219. Blum, Air Crash Death Average: $362,943, 10 NAT'L L.J., May 23, 1988, excerpted in
Brief for Petitioners at A-100, Chan v. Korean Air Lines, 109 S. Ct. 1676 (1989) (No. 87-
1055).
220. Id
221. The Warsaw Convention's limitation on airline liability has outlived its useful-
ness now that the airline industry has outgrown its infancy to establish itself as a
powerful, safe, easily insurable, and stable enterprise. There is no longer any need to
provide special protection to an industry which is capable of reimbursing customers
for the damages it causes them. The Convention's liability limitations, unaccompa-
nied by any meaningful quid pro quo to benefit passengers, is an affront to the Ameri-
can ideal of full and adequate compensation to injured plaintiffs by those responsible
for the harm.
Jeffrey, supra note 156, at 830; Coccia, supra note 154, at 295; see also Burdell, 10 Av. Cas.
(CCH) at 160-61.
Provisions of the Warsaw Convention... that would restrict the damages recov-
erable in the event of an accident to approximately $8,300 ... are arbitrary, irrespon-
sible, capricious and undefensible when they attempt to impose a damage limitation
of considerably less than the undisputed pecuniary losses and damages involved, and
such unjustifible [sic] preferential treatment of international air carriers is
unconstitutional.
Burdell, 10 Av. Cas. (CCH) at 18, 151.
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its constitutional powers remains a legal hurdle.222 The Supreme
Court recognizes that the Convention is outmoded, but has refused to
abrogate the treaty, on the ground that treaty modification and abro-
gation is a sole function of the other branches of government. 223
If the Convention as drafted is unworkable in today's world,
that should not be surprising.... [I]t was written for a few years,
not for a half century of the most rapid and fundamental changes
in the history of the planet. The majority takes the Convention
written for a few years in the era of the Spirit of St. Louis, and
rewrites it in the hope, I presume, that it will last a few more years
into the age of the Space Shuttle. Just why it does so escapes me.
The question whether that needs to be done and the question
whether that should be done are simply not decisions for this Court
to make.
224
Thus, the Court has been hesitant to constitutionally analyze a treaty
and, indeed, has never held a treaty to be unconstitutional.225
Yet, contrary to the Court's assertion, treaty abrogation, modifi-
cation, and condemnation are within the power of the judiciary. An
acceptable, mandatory power of the judiciary is to examine the consti-
tutionality of the acts of the other branches of government. 226 A
treaty is such a governmental act which must not abridge the rights
and guarantees of the Constitution.22 Therefore, a judicial examina-
tion of the constitutionality of treaties would be a valid exercise of the
Court's power.228
A constitutional analysis could potentially reveal that the Con-
222. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals noted, "[w]e know of no doctrine that would
allow us to examine congressional enactments to see if they still serve the purpose for which
they were designed." In re Bali, 684 F.2d at 1308.
223. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 280 (1984) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting).
224. Id.
225. Jeffrey, supra note 156, at 815-16. The Supreme Court has always shown tremendous
deference to the executive and legislative branches' treatymaking power which is allocated to
those respective branches through article II of the United States Constitution. Id.
226. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). The judiciary also has an equita-
ble function to provide full and adequate compensation to injured plaintiffs by imposing the
costs of the damages on the parties responsible for the injuries. Jeffrey, supra note 156, at 832.
227. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
228. In fact, such an examination may be mandatory to uphold the Constitution's system
of checks and balances. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); Jeffrey, supra
note 156, at 815-16; see also Burdell, 10 Av. Cas. (CCH) at 156-57. The court of appeals in In
re Bali noted, "[a]lthough courts are not often called upon to review the constitutionality of
treaty provisions, there is no doubt that the power to make treaties is circumscribed by sub-
stantive provisions of the Constitution, and that the courts are competent to pass on the consti-
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vention and its personal liability limitation constitute either a tak-
ing,229 a substantive due process violation of an individual's
fundamental liberty to travel, 230 or an equal protection violation, un-
constitutionally discriminating between two similar classes of peo-
ple.231 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged these
potential constitutional violations in In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia
on April 22, 1974.232 The In re Bali plaintiffs' first assertion was that
the Convention violated the due process and equal protection clauses
of the fourteenth amendment.233 However, the Ninth Circuit dis-
missed these arguments under the Commerce Clause.
234
The court found that the Warsaw Convention was similar to the
Price-Anderson Act,235 which established liability limits for damage
caused by nuclear power plants. 236 The In re Bali court thus applied
the economic regulation analysis of Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envi-
ronmental Study Group,237 which evolved from prior Price-Anderson
Act cases. 238 The Ninth Circuit characterized the Convention as an
economic regulation which would not be unconstitutional under the
fourteenth amendment unless it was arbitrary or unreasonable.
239
The plaintiffs argued that even under the Duke Power analogy, the
Convention was arbitrary and unreasonable in light of the changed
conditions in the airline industry since the 1929 Convention. 240 How-
ever, the court refused to address this "arbitrary and unreasonable"
argument because it found another available remedy for the plain-
tutionality of treaties." In re Bali, 684 F.2d at 1308-09 (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1
(1957)).
The Italian court, which has similar jurisdictional powers to those of the United States
Supreme Court, acknowledged that the judiciary did not have the power to denounce a treaty.
Coccia, supra note 154, at 296. However, the Italian court was able to examine the constitu-
tionality of the treaty while remaining within the specified powers allocated to the judicial
branch. Id.
229. In re Bali, 684 F.2d at 1309.
230. Id.
231. Id.; Coccia, supra note 154, at 295.
232. 684 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1982).
233. Id. at 1309.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1976).
237. 438 U.S. 59 (1978). The Supreme Court held in Duke Power that the Price-Anderson
Act did not violate the plaintiffs' due process or equal protection rights because there was
sufficient need for the limitation of liability. Id. at 86-87.
238. In re Bali, 684 F.2d at 1309.
239. Id.
240. Jeffrey, supra note 156, at 822.
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tiffs. 241 The court's failure to address the fourteenth amendment
claims left the door open for future plaintiffs to raise this challenge
successfully.
The Ninth Circuit also dismissed the plaintiffs' argument that the
limitation impermissibly burdened the passengers' fundamental right
to travel.242 The court initially held that the right to international
travel was a fundamental right and that no rule or legislation could
penalize that right unless it was narrowly tailored and served an im-
portant governmental interest.243 However, the court again refused to
apply this concept to the plaintiffs' case as the court found that an-
other remedy was available to the plaintiffs.2 "
Although the court would not decide whether the Convention
limit impinged the passengers' fundamental right to travel, the In re
Bali court developed the basis under which future plaintiffs can claim
a fourteenth amendment violation of their fundamental right to
travel. 24 The court suggested that "[t]here are some Government
regulations for which no adequate compensation could be paid, be-
cause they deprive persons of some aspect of life or liberty. In these
cases, the regulation may be a violation of substantive due process. ' 246
The Ninth Circuit has clearly stated that the right to travel is a funda-
mental right;247 thus, a reviewing court would strictly scrutinize the
impingement of that right. Plaintiffs pursuing the right to travel the-
ory would argue that there was no compelling interest behind the lim-
itation because its justifications had become outmoded by the
advances in the airline industry.248 Thus, if the limitation was not
narrowly tailored and did not serve a compelling governmental inter-
est, the limitation would be unconstitutional.
An alternative theory which the In re Bali court raised sua sponte
was a claim of an unconstitutional taking asserted under the Tucker
Act.249 The Tucker Act provides:
241. In re Bali, 684 F.2d at 1309.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 1310.
245. Id.
246. In re Bali, 684 F.2d at 1310.
247. Id. at 1309; see also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
248. See In re Bali, 684 F.2d at 1308.
249. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1988); Jeffrey, supra note 156, at 82 n.144; see generally W.
COWLES, TREATIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, PROPERTY INTERFERENCES AND DUE
PROCESS OF LAW (1941). Cases in the Court of Claims are remedial and seek money judg-
ments against the United States. Id. at 181. Such judgments by the court do not indicate any
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The Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judg-
ment upon any claim against the United States founded either
upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation
of an executive department, or upon any express or implied con-
tract with the United States, or for liquidated damages or unliqui-
dated damages in cases not sounding in tort.
250
One exception to the Tucker Act is that rights "created under or
dependent on" treaties are not actionable under the Act.251 However,
the court evaded the treaty exception in the Tucker Act by relying on
Dames & Moore v. Regan.252 In that case, the Supreme Court allowed
a takings claim to be asserted under an order stemming from an Exec-
utive Agreement. 253 The Dames & Moore Court stated that "[t]he
Government must pay just compensation when it furthers the nation's
foreign goals by using as 'bargaining chips' claims lawfully held by
relatively few persons and subject to the jurisdiction of our courts.
'254
Using this reasoning, the In re Bali court explicitly held that the
Court of Claims had jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs' legitimate tak-
ings claim.
255
However, the In re Bali court held that an actual takings claim
could not yet be established by the plaintiffs. 256 To establish such a
claim, the plaintiffs must first get a judgment for their damages in
excess of the Convention limitation. 257 Then, the trial judge would
have to reduce the award to stay within the Convention limits. 258 The
plaintiffs would then have to pursue all avenues of appeal before they
would finally be able to bring an action in the Court of Claims.25 9 The
effect of these procedures is to practically bar a takings cause of action
even though the In re Bali court created a theoretical attack against
the Convention. The process required to establish a taking is expen-
sive and lengthy. Thus, the chances of a plaintiff successfully bringing
such an action are small. Furthermore, this legal alternative is politi-
limit on the scope of treatymaking power, but rather indicate that the agents of the treaty
power have violated the Constitution. Id. at 181-82.
250. 28 U.S.C. § 1491; see also DeVivo, The Warsaw Convention: Judicial Tolling of the
Death Knell?, 49 J. AIR L. & COM. 71, 132 n.318 (1983).
251. 28 U.S.C. § 1491; In re Bali, 684 F.2d at 1311.
252. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
253. Id. at 689-90.
254. Id. at 691.
255. In re Bali, 684 F.2d at 1313.
256. Id. at 1312.
257. DeVivo, supra note 250, at 135.
258. Id.
259. Id.
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cally and tactically ineffective because the future ramifications could
be extremely costly for the United States government. If plaintiffs can
successfully sue under the Tucker Act, the United States will have to
reimburse all those plaintiffs not compensated by the Convention,
thus placing the burden of protection on the United States govern-
ment.26 Therefore, a constitutional attack under the takings clause,
although technically available to international travelers, may not be a
viable alternative for either the plaintiffs or the United States govern-
ment to use as a challenge to the 1929 Convention.2 61
The In re Bali court left open the possibility of attacking the
Convention as an arbitrary economic regulation, as an impingement
of the fundamental right to travel, or as a taking.2 62 Another poten-
tial legal attack that the In re Bali court did not discuss is an equal
protection argument that the Convention limitation discriminates be-
tween groups of similarly situated individuals. Many different classifi-
cations of individuals have been created in attempts to assert this
equal protection claim.2 63 In Coccia, the Italian court described the
discrimination as either between similarly situated air travelers and
other transportation travelers, or as between different socio-economic
groups of people who are treated the same by the Convention limita-
tion.264 In Burdell v. Canadian Pacific Airlines,265 the court classified
260. Jeffrey, supra note 156, at 824.
261. A finding of a "taking" would not automatically render the Convention unconstitu-
tional. If a Court held that the Convention was a taking, the United States government would
be required to pay just compensation. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Convention would still be
valid if this just compensation was paid to the Convention plaintiffs. However, in the absence
of just compensation, the Convention would be an unconstitutional taking. U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
262. In re Bali, 684 F.2d at 1309-13.
263. See Coccia, supra note 154, at 298; Burdell, 10 Av. Cas. (CCH) at 151.
264. Coccia, supra note 154, at 298-99.
265. 10 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18, 161 (Cir. Ct. Ill. 1968), subsequent opinion, 11 Av. Cas.
(CCH) 17, 353 (1969) (withdrawing ruling on unconstitutionality).
In the original Burdell opinion, Judge Bua found for the plaintiffs on three grounds: (1)
the inapplicability of the Convention on the grounds that Singapore, the origin and destination
of the victim's journey, was not a "High Contracting Party"; (2) insufficiency of the warning
contained in the ticket; and (3) unconstitutionality of the damage limitation and restriction of
venue clauses of the Convention. Id. at 152-53. The judge then granted the defendant airline's
motion requesting withdrawal of the ruling on constitutionality as "unnecessary." Comment,
Warsaw Convention Limitations on Aircarrier Liability: A Critical View, 17 U. MIAMI INTER-
AM. L. REV. 577, 605 (1986). In Judge Bua's second opinion, "he stated that although he
found plaintiff's argument on the constitutionality issue persuasive, he felt constrained to forgo
ruling on that issue, in light of his finding there was no international transportation as defined
by the convention." Id. at 598-99 (footnotes omitted). However, Judge Bua later stated that,
"the court was still persuaded that the venue and damage limitations portions of the treaty
were unconstitutional." Id. at 599 n.108.
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the airlines and other crash defendants, such as manufacturers or the
United States government, as similarly situated groups, and consid-
ered how the airlines were treated differently. 26 Other commentators
have proposed classifying as similarly situated, two passengers sitting
side by side on a domestic flight, one on an intra-country trip, the
other on an international trip. 267 Only the international passenger
would be limited by the Convention. 268 Thus, there are many poten-
tial classifications which suggest discrimination by the Convention
limitations. The basic equal protection attack could be made by a
plaintiff who could describe disparate treatment between individuals
using any of these classifications.
Therefore, although the courts have been hesitant to address the
constitutionality of the Warsaw Convention, legal avenues are avail-
able under which to challenge the treaty's constitutionality. By un-
dertaking such an analysis, a court could address the problems of an
outmoded treaty and align it with modern circumstances without go-
ing beyond its judicial powers. Only in this manner can a 1929 treaty
adequately meet the needs of international travelers in the 1990s.
V. CONCLUSION
The Chan holding created legal chaos for the practical and philo-
sophical future of the Court. Justice Scalia's rigid application of his
New Textualism indicates that future Courts may continue to ex-
amine only the plain meaning of a statute or treaty. While Justice
Scalia asserts that this approach discourages judicial activism, New
Textualism actually increases the potential for judicial manipula-
tion.269 The use of outmoded, arbitrary grammar and rules of logic
can easily be used to defeat even the clearest expression of legislative
266. Jeffrey, supra note 156, at 819.
267. Comment, supra note 265, at 605.
268. Id.
269. For Scalia's arguments that New Textualism limits judicial discretion, see supra notes
147-48, 150 and accompanying text. However, the New Textualism approach is just as manip-
ulable as the traditional approach. Justice Scalia's approach requires choices among compet-
ing evidence, just as the traditional approach requires discretionary choices. Eskridge, supra
note 126, at 675. "Furthermore, [Scalia] potentially expands upon the judge's range of discre-
tion by his revival of the notoriously numerous and manipulable canons of construction." Id.
Critics of Justice Scalia and the new textualists accuse them of having a "hidden agenda": By
narrowly construing the liberal laws of the Democrat-controlled Congress, the new textualists
(mainly conservative Republicans) seek to reduce the power of government to do good in our
society. Id. at 668. (However, Professor Eskridge doubts that this hidden agenda dominates
the intellectual, new textualist theory, but concedes that the political criticism may be partially
true.) Id.
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intent. Furthermore, every canon of construction has a contrary rule,
mandating the opposite interpretation. 270 Thus, a judge can muster
support for virtually any personal construction she may be inclined to
derive, unconstrained by the intent of the statute's drafters. Ironi-
cally, Justice Scalia's New Textualism only increases the potential for
judicial treatywriting.
Secondly, the Convention guarantees afforded future interna-
tional passengers are unclear. Chan left open the question of what
type of notice, if any, the Convention requires.271 Lisi stated that no-
tice in 4-point type, "camouflaged in Lilliputian print," and "virtually
invisible" was inadequate. 272 However, Chan states that 8-point type
provides sufficient notice to the passenger, enabling that person to
take additional, precautionary measures. 273 Yet, Chan also states that
an air carrier cannot be penalized for failure to provide adequate no-
tice. 274 Thus, lower courts are interpreting this to mean that notice of
the Convention's personal injury damage limitation is no longer
required. 27
5
Where the Court will draw the line in the future is uncertain, for
it has created a situation in which adequate notice can only be deter-
mined on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis. The Court has disregarded
270. The new textualists are reluctant to use those canons which emphasize substantive
policy choice and instead rely exclusively on canons which rest upon precepts of grammar,
logic, proceduralism, and federalism. Eskridge, supra note 126, at 663. "The new textualists
are not only selective about which of the canons of construction they will use in any given case,
but they are also prone to tinker with some of the canons. As the canons change over time
(which is inevitable anyway), the background assumptions change." Id. at 677. "So long as
the new textualism relies heavily on the canons of construction, its methodology will often be
more arbitrary and less constraining than that of the traditional approach." Id. at 676.
271. Certainly some type of actual notice of the liability statement is required in order to
fulfill the express language of Article 3 and to prevent the ticket from becoming an adhesion
contract. Albert, Limitations on Air Carrier Liability: An Inadvertent Return to Common Law
Principles, 48 J. AIR L. & COM. 111, 138 (1982). "Due to industry wide uniformity, the con-
tract involved (the airline ticket) takes on the attributes of an adhesion contract, where the
prospective passenger can either accept the limitations or refrain from using the airlines as a
mode of transportation." Comment, supra note 265, at 587. In the situation between the
passenger and the airline, there is unequal bargaining power. The international passenger has
no alternatives other than international airlines; thus, the passenger has no opportunity to
personally bargain with the airline. Albert, supra, at 145. Therefore, proper notice of the
limitation binding the passenger's travel is necessary to create a valid contract. Id. at 146.
272. Lisi, 370 F.2d at 514.
273. Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1691-93.
274. Id. at 1683-85.
275. In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, La. on July 9, 1982, 883 F.2d 17 (5th
Cir. 1989) (remand hearing after 821 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1987)).
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the 10-point type requirements of the Montreal Agreement 276 and the
CAB administrative regulation, 277 and instead, has substituted its own
interpretation-that the Convention mandates no specific type stan-
dard.278 The Court used a rigid, philosophical interpretation to defeat
the original intent of the Convention drafters. Therefore, the future
viability of the Convention, and all international treaties and statutes,
are vulnerable to the Court's manipulative, new textualist
interpretation.
Tracy A. Thomas*
276. Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1679, 1692. The majority and the concurrence disregard the
Montreal Agreement's requirement of 10-point type notice as not having the effect of supreme
law of the land and considered the issues solely under the Convention. Id. However, lower
courts have treated the Montreal Agreement as an amendment to the Convention. See In re
Air Crash at Warsaw, Pol. on March 14, 1980, 705 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1983). In In re
Warsaw, the appellate court specifically stated, "[w]hatever merit [the airline's] argument
might have were we considering the adequacy of notice solely under the Warsaw Convention,
the fact remains that we are not." Id. The In re Warsaw court found that the Montreal
Agreement merited the force of a United States amendment to the Convention because this
agreement led to the United States withdrawing its denunciation of the Convention. Id. at 90.
Additionally, other courts have utilized the Montreal Agreement to give substantive effect
to ambiguous terms in the Convention. The court in Husserl v. Swiss Air, 351 F. Supp. 702
(S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd, 485 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1973), looked to the Montreal Agreement to
find a substantive definition for the Convention's term "accident." Id. at 706. Using this
reasoning, the Chan court could have similarly used the Montreal Agreement to define the
Convention's required "liability statement."
277. Prior decisions of the Court have placed great weight on CAB regulations. In Trans
World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243 (1984), the Court accepted an air
freight limitation that was privately determined by Trans World Airlines and accepted by the
CAB. Id. at 261 (Stevens, J., dissenting). This CAB regulation was directly apposite to the
original standard in the Convention. Id. at 261-62. However, the Court found that the CAB
standard furthered the original purposes of the Convention drafters better than the original
Convention standard. Id. Thus, in the past, the Court has allowed the CAB regulations to
define the terms of the Convention, even when such terms were specifically defined by the
Convention itself. Id. at 261-62.
278. Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1693.
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